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Numerous psychophysical studies suggest that the sensorimotor system chooses actions that optimize the
average cost associated with a movement. Recently, however, violations of this hypothesis have been
reported in line with economic theories of decision-making that not only consider the mean payoff,
but are also sensitive to risk, that is the variability of the payoff. Here, we examine the hypothesis that
risk-sensitivity in sensorimotor control arises as a mean-variance trade-off in movement costs. We
designed a motor task in which participants could choose between a sure motor action that resulted in
a ﬁxed amount of effort and a risky motor action that resulted in a variable amount of effort that
could be either lower or higher than the ﬁxed effort. By changing the mean effort of the risky action
while experimentally ﬁxing its variance, we determined indifference points at which participants chose
equiprobably between the sure, ﬁxed amount of effort option and the risky, variable effort option.
Depending on whether participants accepted a variable effort with a mean that was higher, lower or
equal to the ﬁxed effort, they could be classiﬁed as risk-seeking, risk-averse or risk-neutral. Most subjects
were risk-sensitive in our task consistent with a mean-variance trade-off in effort, thereby, underlining the
importance of risk-sensitivity in computational models of sensorimotor control.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In the ﬁelds of psychology and economic decision-
making, it is well established that risk attitudes inﬂuence
human behaviour. For example, when given a choice
between a sure bet of $50 and a 50 : 50 chance of winning
$100 or $0, most people would prefer the sure bet, even
though on average the two options have the same mean
payoff. In fact, a risk-averse decision-maker would even
prefer a sure bet with a slightly lower payoff, say $45,
and thus accept a $5 risk premium—a fact that is
exploited by insurance companies in their policies.
By contrast, risk-seeking individuals assign higher value
to options that have greater variability—for example,
when gambling in a casino. Risk might also play an impor-
tant role in motor tasks. Consider, for example, a climber
who has to choose between different routes—a long
secure route or a shorter route that could lead to the
goal faster, but could take longer if slippery. On his way
he might be faced with many such decisions.
The theory of risk in decision-making goes back to the
eighteenth century [1] and has since ﬂourished into a host
of different models of decision-making under uncertainty
[2–7]. One of the most popular risk models in modern
ﬁnance is Markowitz’ risk-return model, in which the
value U(x) of an investment x is modelled as a trade-off
between the expected payoff (mean return) E(x) and the
variability of the payoff (risk) Var(x), such that U(x) ¼
E(x) 2 uVar(x). The parameter u expresses the decision-
maker’s risk attitude: risk-neutral decision-makers are
only sensitive to the expected payoff (u ¼ 0), while risk-
averse individuals discount payoff variability (u . 0) and
risk-seekers consider it a bonus (u , 0). In biology,
mean-variance models of risk-sensitivity have been pre-
viously applied in ecology [8] and neuroeconomics,
elucidating the neural underpinnings of risk-sensitivity
in economic choice tasks [9–16]. In psychology and
behavioural economics, many other studies have also pro-
vided evidence for risk-sensitivity in the context of
prospect theory, in which risk is thought to arise through
nonlinear distortions of values and probabilities [3].
In contrast, most research on the human motor system
has emphasized risk-neutrality and has not considered
payoff variance as a potential inﬂuence on behaviour.
For example, a number of studies have proposed that
humans choose movement strategies so as to maximize
an average gain in inherently uncertain motor tasks that
involve both spatially [17–19] and temporally structured
rewards [20,21]. As average gain models only consider
mean rewards, they are neutral with respect to risk. Simi-
larly, current computational theories of motor control
often consider exclusively mean movement costs and
are, therefore, risk-neutral. For example, in most studies
on optimal feedback control theory, the optimal
behaviour does not consider how variable the movement
cost is, but only depends on the average cost [22–27].
Recently, however, violations of the mean payoff
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et al. [28] showed, for example, that in a pointing task
subjects exhibit risk-seeking behaviour in line with pro-
spect theory, because they systematically underweight
small probabilities and overweight large probabilities of
hitting designated targets by pointing movements. Simi-
larly, Nagengast et al. [29] showed that subjects exhibit
risk-averse behaviour in a motor task that required them
to control a Brownian particle under different levels of
noise. Subjects’ changes in control gain depended on
their risk-sensitivity in line with the predictions of a
risk-sensitive optimal feedback controller [30]. Here, we
examine the hypothesis that risk-sensitivity in sensori-
motor control tasks can be understood as a trade-off
between the mean movement cost and the variability of the
cost, analogous to the risk-return model used in economics.
2. METHODS
(a) Experimental set-up
Fifteen right-handed subjects (eight male, seven female, aged
20–30) participated in the experiment after providing
written informed consent. The experimental protocols
were approved by the local ethics committee. Subjects were
naive to the purpose of the experiment and none of the sub-
jects reported any sensory or motor deﬁcits. While seated,
subjects used their right hand to grasp the handle of a
vBOT force-generating robotic manipulandum, which
could be moved in the horizontal plane (for details, see
[31]). The position and velocity of the hand were computed
online at 1000Hz. Subjects could not see their arm but the
position of their hand could be displayed in the plane of
the arm using a reﬂected rear-projection system.
Thetaskwasanimplicitmotor versionofabinaryeconomic
decision-making task. In the economics domain probabilities
and rewards (or losses) are typically both represented explicitly
by informing subjects about the numbers involved. In contrast,
in our task losses were determined by the effort subjects had to
exert to achieve a movement and the probabilities were deter-
mined implicitly by the subjects’ motor variability. We used a
two-alternative forced-choice paradigm in which subjects
chose on each trial between a certain ﬁxed effort movement
and a gamble in which they would have to make either a lower
or higher (than the ﬁxed) effort movement. Which of these
efforts they would experience if they chose the gamble was
determined probabilistically, with probability phit and 1 2 phit,
respectively. The probability phit was implicitly encoded by the
size of a small target region subjects could try to hit in a limited
time(withthetargetsizecalibratedsothattheprobabilityofhit-
ting the target, phit, was controlled). If the target was hit, they
then made the lower effort movement, but if they missed they
madethe highereffort movement.Each trial ofthe experiment,
therefore, involved two stages. First, subjects made a choice
between a sure and a risky strategy (decision stage) and then
produced a movement under the associated effort level (effort
stage). The main experimental manipulation was to change
the effort levels over trials so as to inﬂuence the mean and var-
ianceoftheeffortandstudyhowthesechangesinﬂuencechoice
behaviour. Subjects were instructed to choose the option that
they preferred.
(i) Decision stage
The decision stage started with three effort circles (green,
yellow and red; 0.75 cm radius) being displayed along the
vertical axis of the screen (ﬁgure 1). The effort circles
represented all the possible effort levels that could be experi-
enced by the subject in the effort stage of that trial. The
yellow circle was always xyellow ¼ 10 cm from the start
location (the sure bet), while the test stimuli were rep-
resented by the green and red circles, with the green
circle always having a shorter distance, xgreen , 10 cm (lower
effort), and the red circle always a greater distance, xred . 10
cm (higher effort), from the starting location. The colours of
the three effort circles corresponded to the colours that were
used to indicate different target regions on two walls that
were located 20 cm lateral to the starting location and
extended the full height of the screen. Subjects moved from
the starting location to hit one of the two walls. The left
wall was entirely yellow, whereas the right wall was red with
a green region embedded whose height was varied between
trials (ﬁgure 1). The green region determined the probability
of phit, which was equilibrated in a test session to ﬁt subjects’
individual motor variability (compare experimental sessions).
Depending on which of the three colour regions subjects hit
they would have to move to the corresponding effort circle.
Therefore, they could always choose the yellow effort circle
if they wished (sure bet) or take the risky option of aiming
for the green region and either reach to the green or red
effort circle depending on the outcome. To make the task
more demanding, the movement time was limited to 0.3 s
(if longer, subjects had to repeat the trial) and we introduced
a visual gain of 3 in the y-direction relative to the starting
location (i.e. errors were magniﬁed threefold) and this gain
was kept constant throughout the experiment.
(ii) Effort stage
After they had made their decision and hit one of the regions,
subjects had to move their hand to the corresponding effort
circle and hold it there for 1.5 s against a spring-like force
Fright that was pushing them to the right and whose magni-
tude was proportional to the distance x that they were away
from the starting location, Fright ¼ k . x. The spring constant
k was adjusted to the strength of each subject at the begin-
ning of the experiment. We used body weight as a proxy
for maximum force production and the spring constants
ranged from k ¼ 125 Nm
21 for the lightest (weight approx.
50kg) to k ¼ 200 Nm
21 for the heaviest subject (weight
approx. 80 kg). As the spatial range of targets was small we
ignore changes in conﬁguration on the arm (biomechanics)
affecting the subjective measures of effort.
(iii) Experimental sessions
The ﬁrst 200 trials were a training session, in which subjects
practiced hitting the green region on the right-hand side,
which varied in size from trial-to-trial (0.5–5cm, 20 trials
each). Thenext50trials familiarized subjectswiththedifferent
effort levels. Subjects moved to hit the yellow wall anywhere
along its length and then moved to the yellow effort circle
whose distance varied from trial-to-trial (1–19cm, ﬁve trials
each). The subsequent 100 trials (the ‘s-estimation session’)
was used to estimate subjects’ endpoint variability. Subjects
attempted to hit a small 0.5cm green region (equivalent to a
range of motion of the hand of 0.5/3 ¼ 0.16cm owing to the
visual gain). The variance of the (approx.) Gaussian endpoint
distribution was used to establish the relationship between
target size and hitting probability for different target sizes that
was used subsequently. The last 400 trials were the test session
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(iv) Stimulus set for ﬁnding indifference points
We wished to examine how variability of the effort affected
subjects’ choices between the sure bet and the risky strategy.
To do this, we wanted to ﬁnd indifference points where sub-
jects would choose each possibility equiprobably (p ¼ 0.5).
As we were interested in how variance affects the indifference
point we created stimulus sets for the risky choice that had a
ﬁxed variance and only varied in the mean—thereby ﬁnding
the mean for the risky choice to which subjects would be
indifferent to choosing the sure bet. To create this stimulus
set with a ﬁxed variance that differs only in the mean
effort, we manipulated both the hitting probabilities (height
of the green region) and effort levels of the risky choice
(locations of the red and green effort circles).
We discretized both probability and effort space, com-
puted all possible combinations and selected those
combinations that had a particular variance within a given
tolerance. The probability of hitting a target phit was discre-
tized into steps of 0.01 (101 levels) corresponding to a set
of heights of the green region that depended on the individ-
ual subject’s variance in pointing. The movement effort was
discretized into steps of 0.5cm with Ehit ranging from 0 to
9.5cm and Emiss from 11.5 to 20 cm, corresponding to the
effort for the green and red circles. All possible combinations
of Ehit, Emiss and phit (hence pmiss ¼ 1 2 phit) were considered
resulting in 20   20   101 ¼ 40, 400 combinations. The
mean effort m ¼ phit . Ehit þ pmiss . Emiss and the variance
s
2 ¼ (Ehit 2 m)
2 . phit þ (Emiss 2 m)
2 . pmiss were computed
for all combinations. Lotteries with a variance of s
2 ¼
f1,5,11,17,24g+0.5 were selected and saved as ﬁve stimu-
lus sets used in the experiment resulting in n ¼
f1148,1366,1076,780,713g different stimuli for every set.
From these ﬁve stimulus sets, we selected those stimuli for
presentation during the experiment that would provide maxi-
mum information about the subjects’ indifference points
(mean effort) where subjects would choose equiprobably
between the risky strategy and the sure bet strategy. To this
end, we selected the stimuli based on a standard adaptive ﬁt-
ting protocol (QUEST) [32,33]. This method selects the next
stimulus to lie within the 95% conﬁdence interval of the cur-
rent estimate of the indifference point based on ﬁtting all the
data to a logistic function. The trials for each of the ﬁve var-
iance levels were interleaved in a pseudo-random order with
a total of 80 trials at each variance level. This procedure pro-
duced indifference points for each of the ﬁve variance levels.
(b) Models
To estimate subjects’ risk-sensitivity, we modelled decisions
made by ideal actor models whose choices were contami-
nated by noise and we used maximum-likelihood methods
to estimate parameters of the ideal actor models. In particu-
lar, we considered the mean-variance model and prospect
theory to explain subjects’ choice behaviour. The noise
model for both cases can be found together with the methods
for the model comparison in the electronic supplementary
material.
(i) Mean-variance model
As outlined in §1, the mean-variance model of risk-sensitivity
postulates a utility function that contains terms that include
both the mean payoff and the variance of the payoff such
that U1(x) ¼2E(x) þ u1 Var(x), where x is the distribution
of possible distances to the effort circles and u1 is the risk-
parameter (risk-averse for u1 , 0, risk-neutral for u1 ¼ 0
and risk-seeking for u1 . 0). Note that the sign of the utility
has been reversed since distances are ‘disutilities’. Also note
that we can use the distance x as a proxy for effort, since
the force depends on x in a linear fashion and utilities are car-
dinal up to a linear transform—that is, choices that satisfy the
usual rationality axioms can be represented by a utility index
that is unique up to a linear transformation. We also use a
slightly more general formulation of risk-sensitivity, by
including higher order statistics beyond the variance. This
can be easily achieved by means of a utility function of the
form U2(x) ¼ 2u2
21 lnE(e
2(1/2)u2x) that has the same terms
as U1(x) in the ﬁrst two terms of its Taylor Series expansion
(with u2 ¼ 4u1). Importantly, the same generalization can be
used to introduce risk-sensitivity to optimal feedback control
force
1
2
probability utility certainty
1 phit
1 – phit
1 – phit
Figure 1. Schematic of experiment. A trial in the ‘mean-var-
iance session’ consisted of two stages: a decision stage and an
effort stage. Three possible circular targets were displayed
(green, the closest; red, the furthest; yellow, always at
10 cm from the origin). The target selection from these
depended on the outcome of the decision stage. (1) In lim-
ited time, subjects chose to move their hand (represented
by the small blue circle) either to the left or to the right.
The left-hand side was a sure bet and the yellow circular
target was always selected. Moving to the right was risky
and subjects attempted to hit a small green target. Having
established the subjects’ Gaussian endpoint distribution for
this movement previously, a given target size corresponded
to a particular probability of hitting the target phit. Therefore,
if subjects chose the risky strategy they would have a prob-
ability of phit of hitting the green target-wall and 12 phit of
hitting the red target-wall. The size of the yellow wall was
always the same. (2) In the effort stage, subjects moved to
the corresponding target where they had to push against a
stiff spring requiring a force Fright. We varied the probability
phit and the red and green circular target positions to estab-
lish for which effort level subjects were indifferent between
the sure bet and the risky option for ﬁve levels of effort
variance.
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can be represented as U2(xyellow) ¼ 2xyellow and the risky
alternative as U2(fxgreen, xredg) ¼ 2u2
21 ln(phit e
2(1/2)u2xgreen þ
(1 2 phit)e
2(1/2)u2xred).
(ii) Prospect theory
Unlike the mean-variance approach, prospect theory does
not have a single risk-parameter. Instead, prospect theory
postulates different value functions v
þ(x) and v
2(x) that dis-
tort the objective value of x and different probability
weighting functions w
þ(p) and w
2(p) that distort the objec-
tive probabilities depending on a particular reference point,
i.e. depending on whether one deals with gains (þ)o r
losses (2) or both. Risk-sensitivity then depends on the
shape of the value function as well as the shape of the weight-
ing function. In our experiment, we exclusively deal with
losses, since all outcomes require effort (the reference point
is 0 effort). For pure loss prospects, the utility of a prospect
with binary outcomes xred and xgreen and associated probabil-
ities (1 2 phit), and phit is given by U(x) ¼ [1 2 w
2(phit)]
v
2(xgreen) þ w
2((1 2 phit))v
2(xred). To parameterize this
decision model, we used a standard value function family
proposed by Kahnemann & Tversky [3] v
2(x) ¼2x
a and
a common probability weighting function family proposed
by Prelec [34] w
2(p) ¼ exp[2(2ln p)
g]. The decision model is
then determined by the parameters a and g.C o n s e q u e n t l y ,w e
can write the sure bet option as U(xyellow ) ¼ v
2(xyellow)a n dt h e
risky option as U(fxgreen, xredg) ¼ (1 2 w
2(phit)) v
2(xgreen) þ
w
2(1 2 phit )v
2(xred).
3. RESULTS
(a) Mean-variance indifference points
To test the mean-variance hypothesis of risk for motor
control, we designed a probabilistic decision-making
task in which subjects could choose between a sure
bet—a movement of a ﬁxed effort—or a risky option—a
movement entailing either a lower or higher effort
(ﬁgure 1). By controlling the mean and variance of the
effort of the risky option, we found indifference points
where subjects chose equiprobably between the sure bet
and the risky option (see electronic supplementary
material, ﬁgure S1 shows the psychometric curves for a
typical subject). These indifference points were stable
through the course of the experiment—that is they did
not shift owing to fatigue, for example—and thus they
reﬂect a stationary choice pattern (see electronic sup-
plementary material, results and ﬁgure S2). At the
indifference point, the mean effort of the risky choice
relative to the ﬁxed effort could be equal (risk-neutral),
higher (risk-seeking) or lower (risk-averse). Therefore,
risk-averse subjects only accept the risky reach if the
mean effort level is lower than the ﬁxed effort alternative,
whereas risk-seeking subjects are prepared to take a
gamble even at unfavourable odds with the hope for the
improbable outcome requiring lower effort than the
ﬁxed effort alternative.
Figure 2 shows the indifference points at the ﬁve
variance levels for all 14 subjects. We used weighted
least-squares regression to obtain linear ﬁts of the ﬁve
mean-variance indifference points. The slope of these
ﬁts informs us about the risk-sensitivity. A slope of zero
is compatible with risk-neutrality. A non-zero slope of
these ﬁts implies that subjects modulated their
indifference points depending on the level of variance.
As can be seen by the regressions marked with an asterisks
in ﬁgure 2, for all except three subjects, the null hypoth-
esis of risk-neutrality, i.e. a line indistinguishable from the
horizontal, could be rejected with p , 0.05.
(b) Mean-variance models
The slope of the linear ﬁts allowed us also to infer the
risk-parameter in the simple mean-variance model. For
the sure-bet reach, the effort circle is always at 10 cm,
i.e. U1
s ¼ 2E(10) ¼ 210, and for the risky option
U1
r(x) ¼2E(x) þ u1Var(x). The curve of indifference points
of mean effort levels at different variances can hence be
described by the condition U1
s ¼ U1
r(x) resulting in
EðxÞ¼u1VarðxÞþ10; ð3:1Þ
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Figure 2. Mean-variance trade-off. The result of the
experiment for all 14 subjects ordered from the most
risk-seeking to the most risk-averse. The indifference points
+s.d. obtained from the ﬁve psychometric curves are
shown in black. The best lines of ﬁt obtained using weighted
linear regression are shown in blue. The risk-attitude par-
ameter u1 is the line’s slope and is shown in the right-hand
corners of the subplots. For all but three subjects, the null
hypothesis of risk-neutrality could be rejected with p , 0.05
(marked with an asterisk).
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determine, and 10 is expected tobethe intercept of theindif-
ference curve. Based on this analysis, we found that the
majority of subjects, that is nine subjects, can be classiﬁed
a sr i s k - s e e k i n gi nt h et a s k ,t h r e ea si n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l ef r o m
risk-neutral and the remaining two as risk-averse. The risk-
attitudeparameteru1rangedfrom0.46forthemostrisk-seek-
ingto20.2forthemostrisk-aversesubject(seetable1forthe
estimated values). This provides evidence that subjects are
not indifferent to the variance of the outcome but have a
certain attitude towards risk that inﬂuences their decisions.
To check for consistency of the inferred risk-sensitivity
parameters, we used a slightly more complex mean-
variance model (see §2) to derive risk-sensitivity
parameters based on subjects’ trial-by-trial choices and
then compared the two sets of risk-parameters for all
subjects. The ideal actor model assumed a utility function
U2(x) ¼ 22u2
21lnE(e
2(1/2)u2x), where u2 is a risk-
parameter. We used a maximum-likelihood method to
estimate the parameter u2 for each subject (see electronic
supplementary material, methods for details). The risk-
attitude parameter u2 ranged from 0.43 for the most
risk-seeking to 20.34 for the most risk-averse subject
(see table 1 for the estimated values). The results
obtained using the two methods to estimate the risk
parameters u1 and u2 are in good agreement (r ¼ 0.91,
p , 0.0001). To test whether this risk-based model was
better than a risk-neutral model, we used the Bayesian
information criterion (BIC) to compare the ideal actor
model to a risk-neutral model. The BIC for the risk-
sensitive model was smaller than for the risk-neutral
model (risk-neutral decision-maker: BIC ¼ 6256.1, risk-
sensitive decision-maker: BIC ¼ 6156.2) supporting the
risk-sensitive model and corroborating the ﬁndings from
the regression analysis of the indifference points. A likeli-
hood ratio test for nested models conﬁrmed the ﬁnding of
the BIC analysis and showed that the risk-sensitive model
ﬁts the data signiﬁcantly better (p , 0.001).
We also ﬁt the risk-sensitive ideal actor model with two
different coordinate systems, where forces are not perceived
linearly, but nonlinearly either as the square (super-linear)
or the square root (sub-linear) of the objective force.
The utility model then is given by U2(x) ¼22u2
21
lnE(e
2(1/2)u2x2
)andU2ðxÞ¼  2u 1
2 lnEðe ð1=2Þu2
ﬃﬃ
x
p
Þ,respect-
ively. Importantly, nonlinear transformations of the utility
lead to the representation of different preferences. However,
thebestﬁtsfor thesenonlinearscalesweresigniﬁcantlyworse
than the best ﬁts with the linear force scale ( p , 0.001,
likelihood ratio test). This suggests that our mean-variance
modelthatassumedanundistortedperceptionoftheexperi-
enced forces ﬁts the data better than mean-variance models
that assume either super-linear or sub-linear perception of
the experienced forces.
(c) Prospect theory model
A different way of looking at human decision-making has
been suggested by Kahnemann & Tversky. In their orig-
inal formulation of prospect theory [3] and its later
extension cumulative prospect theory (CPT) [35], devi-
ations from risk-neutrality are due to two factors—the
distortion of probabilities in the probability weighting
function and the curvature in the value function. In
CPT, people’s value function is described as convex for
monetary losses and concave for monetary gains. In
addition, people act as if they misperceive probability,
putting too much weight on small probabilities and too
little weight on large probabilities. This is captured by a
value function and probability weighting function whose
shape is determined by a parameter a and g, respectively
(see §2 for details). We repeated the maximum-likelihood
analysis for a CPT decision-maker and estimated the par-
ameters a and g (see table 1 and ﬁgure 3a,b). The three
subjects that had been classiﬁed as risk-averse had
convex value functions, the remaining subjects had con-
cave value functions. In general, the estimated u2 and a
were anti-correlated (r ¼ 20.89, p , 0.001). The picture
was more mixed for the probability weighting function
(r ¼ 20.43, p . 0.05) but the majority of subjects
seemed to be under rather than overweight small prob-
abilities (g ¼ 1.51+0.23). Based on BIC, a model
comparison with the risk-neutral model was not in
favour of the CPT model (risk-neutral decision-maker:
BIC ¼ 6256.1, CPT decision-maker: BIC ¼ 6293.9);
Table 1. Parameter estimates. Mean-variance (U1). The mean parameter estimates of u1+s.d. of a mean-variance decision-
maker obtained from the linear regression analysis of the subjects’ indifference points (see ﬁgure 2). Mean-Variance (U2).
The mean parameter estimates of u2 + s.d. (estimated using bootstrapping with 1000 repetitions) of a mean-variance
decision-maker obtained using a maximum-likelihood analysis of a noisy decision-maker. Prospect theory. The mean
parameter estimates of a+s.d. and g+s.d. (estimated using bootstrapping with 1000 repetitions) of a prospect theory
decision-maker obtained using a maximum-likelihood analysis of a noisy decision-maker.
subject
1234567891 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4
mean-variance (U1)
u1 0.46 0.16 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.02 20.05 20.05 20.2
+ 0.18 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.06
mean-variance (U2)
u2 0.43 0.18 0.22 0.25 0.27 0.13 0.16 0.13 0.19 0.1 0.06 20.18 20.07 20.34
+ 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03
prospect theory
a 0.28 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.22 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.25 0.28 0.12 2.61 2.76 4.76
+ 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.14 0.18 0.04 0.23 0.45 0.22
g 0.54 1.28 1.45 0.94 0.76 1.67 1.59 2.31 0.88 0.93 2.05 1.22 3.87 1.71
+ 0.1 0.14 0.13 0.1 0.08 0.31 0.21 0.26 0.11 0.12 0.17 0.15 0.24 0.08
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the CPT model was preferred (risk-neutral decision-maker:
AIC ¼ 6163.2,CPTdecision-maker:AIC ¼ 6015.4).Com-
paring the CPT model to the mean-variance model, we
found that the mean-variance model was preferred both
based on BIC (mean-variance model: BIC ¼ 6156.2, CPT
decision-maker: BIC ¼ 6293.9) and based on AIC (mean-
variance model: AIC ¼ 5970.6, CPT decision-maker:
AIC ¼ 6015.4).
(d) Control of experimental assumptions
Our experiment depends on the assumption that the
subjects’ endpoint variability did not change from the
‘s-estimation session’ to the ‘mean-variance session’.
This was true for 14 out of 15 subjects (all p . 0.3,
two-sample Kolmogorov–Smirnov test for the mean-
corrected endpoint-distribution of the ‘s-estimation
session’ and the ‘mean-variance session’). On average, the
endpoint-variability (s)o fs u b j e c t sw a s1 . 9 0 + 0.44 cm
in the ‘s-estimation session’ and 1.86+0.31 cm in the
‘mean-variance session’. One subject had to be excluded
from the analysis as the standard deviation of his movements
changed drastically from 5.86cm in the ‘s-estimation ses-
sion’ to 1.70cm in ‘mean-variance session’ (p , 0.002,
two-sample Kolmogorov–Smirnov test). Furthermore, our
experimental design relied on predicting the subjects’ hitting
probability from their endpoint variability. Figure 3c shows a
plot of the empirical probability of hitting the target in the
‘mean-variance session’ versus the hitting probability
predicted by using subjects’ endpoint variability from the
‘s-estimation session’. Using linear regression on the data
after subtracting the diagonal and testing for zero slope
(t8 ¼ 1.08, p . 0.3) and zero intercept (t8 ¼ 0.9, p . 0.3)
suggests coincidence of the data with the diagonal and
hence conﬁrms accurate prediction of hitting probabilities
during the experiment.
4. DISCUSSION
In our study, we examined whether subjects are sensitive to
the variance of movement costs rather than just the mean
level of movement costs. In particular, we investigated
how subjects trade off the mean effort against the variabil-
ity of effort during a movement. Compared with the
baseline of a ﬁxed certain effort, we found that most sub-
jects were prepared to accept a gamble with higher mean
effort when variability was high (risk-seeking), whereas
some were risk-neutral and a minority would only accept
a lower mean effort (risk-averse). Our results are consistent
with a risk-sensitive decision-maker that trades off the
mean and variance of movement effort, but inconsistent
with a risk-neutral account of motor control.
A number of previous studies have found that people
maximize expected gain in movement tasks in which sub-
jects made speeded pointing movements and the spatial
[18,19] or temporal outcome [20,21] of their movement
resulted in a monetary payoff. These studies compared
subjects’ behaviour with an ideal actor model that maxi-
mized expected payoff. Crucially, the optimal movement
strategy suggested by such models is independent of the
variance of the payoff. This should, however, not be
confused with the variance of the movement outcome
(see electronic supplementary material, discussion for
mathematical details). The fact that various kinds of
movement variability play an important role in the
choice of suitable movement strategies is well known
[17] and taken into account by expected gain models.
This raises the question as to why these previous studies
have not reported risk-sensitivity. One key difference
from our study is that in these previous studies the
mean and variance of the reward were not manipulated
independently of each other making it difﬁcult to estab-
lish the effect of one variable alone on subjects’
behaviour. Implicit in the ‘gain-maximization hypothesis’
is also that the utility of money is linear across the whole
range and not concave for gains and convex for losses as is
the usual consensus in behavioural economics [3].
A possible reason why the linear utility function is suc-
cessful is that these studies used very small monetary
remunerations of only a few cents (2.5 cents maximum
reward per trial and 12.5 cents maximum loss per trial
[18,19,36]). That is they effectively only tested subjects
over a very narrow (possibly linear) range of their utility
functions. Indeed, a recent study that used larger rewards
reported the same value function for money in movement
tasks as in economic decision-making tasks [28] and is at
odds with the ‘expected gain maximization’ hypothesis.
Wu et al. [28] examined violations of expected utility
theory in a motor task that involved making accurate
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Figure 3. Parameter estimates for the prospect theory ﬁts and control results. (a) The estimated value function for each subject
(blue) and the mean across subject (red). The dashed line indicates a risk-neutral value function. (b) The estimated probability
weighting function w(p) for each subject (blue) and the mean across subject (red). The dashed line indicates no distortion of
probabilities. (c) The empirical probability of hitting the target in the ‘mean-variance session’ versus the hitting probability pre-
dicted by using subjects’ endpoint variability from the ‘s-estimation session’ with 1 s.e.m. across subjects. The dashed lines
indicates a perfect match between the two.
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lations of the so-called independence axiom, stating that
preferences should not be affected by the addition of a
‘common consequence’. Consider two different tasks in
which subjects can choose between lotteries of the form
[p1U($V1), p2U($V2), ...] where there is a probability p1
of receiving $V1 that has a subjective utility of U($V1),
etc (we assume without loss of generality that U($0) ¼ 0).
In the ﬁrst task, we can choose between two lotteries
[0.33U($2500), 0.67U($0)] and [0.34U($2400), 0.66
U($0)]. In a second task, we can choose between
[0.33U($2500), 0.66U($2400), 0.01U($0)] and [0.66
U($2400), 0.34U($2400)] ¼ [1.0U($2400)]. These two
tasks only differ in their ‘common consequence’ in that
the second task simply adds 0.66U($2400) to both
lotteries in task 1. However, in the ﬁrst task, people
tend to prefer the ﬁrst lottery implying that 0.33
U($2500) . 0.34U($2400) whereas in the second task
they tend to prefer the second lottery as it has a guaran-
teed outcome. Therefore, some decision-makers reverse
their preference between the tasks. Importantly, expected
utility theory does not allow preference reversals of this
kind. Wu et al. [28] observed, however, exactly this kind
of preference reversals violating the independence
axiom. By introducing common consequences in their
task, Wu et al. [28] simultaneously changed the mean
and the variance of their payoffs. In contrast, in our exper-
imental design we did not use common consequences and
instead were able to ﬁx the payoff variance of the risky lot-
tery and only change its mean payoff. By examining
subjects choice between this risky lottery and the certain
lottery (zero variance and ﬁxed payoff), we could directly
measure indifference points (for ﬁve different levels of
variance) where subjects chose equiprobably between
the two lotteries. This separate manipulation of mean
and variance allowed us to directly show that subjects
trade off mean and variance of movement costs.
To compare our results to Wu et al. [28], we also ﬁt a
prospect theory model to our data, where risk-sensitivity
depends both on the distortion of the probability weight-
ing function and the curvature of the value function.
Similar to their results, our ﬁt indicated that small prob-
abilities were underweighted in most subjects and that the
value function was mostly concave, both of which is con-
sistent with risk-seeking behaviour. However, whether the
brain represents risk in agreement with either the mean-
variance approach or with the prospect theory account
is currently subject of an ongoing debate [37]. Recent evi-
dence from electrophysiological and functional imaging
studies has provided support for both theories. In support
of the mean-variance approach, separate encoding of
reward magnitude and risk has been reported in
humans [14–16] as well as in non-human primates
[38]. However, recent studies have also found neural
evidence in favour of prospect theory. Martino et al.
[39], for example, reported neural correlates of the fram-
ing effect, that is the susceptibility of the decision-maker
to the manner in which options are presented. In
addition, Hsu et al. [40] found that neural responses in
the brain depended on probabilities in a nonlinear fashion
during a risky task. Both effects are cornerstones of pro-
spect theory. In our experiment, the model comparison
favours the mean-variance approach. However, further
studies are needed to elucidate how the brain represents
value and how the brain0s different valuation and action
selection system interact and vie for control to arrive at
an overt behavioural decision [41].
Current computational accounts of motor control-like
optimal feedback control theory are risk-neutral [26,27]
and only consider minimization of the expectation of a
cost function, usually with terms for positional accuracy
and effort. The variance of the cost does not inﬂuence
these models when computing the optimal movement
policy. However, models of risk-sensitive optimal feed-
back controllers are compatible with a mean-variance
trade-off in movement costs as found in the current
study, because the ﬁrst two terms of the Taylor expansion
of the risk-sensitive cost function correspond to mean and
variance of the movement cost. Recently, we have shown
how risk-sensitive optimal feedback control can account
for sensorimotor behaviour under uncertainty in a con-
tinuous motor task where subjects had to control a
Brownian particle under different noise levels [29]. In
this previous study, we found that subjects showed
mostly risk-averse behaviour, whereas in the current
study and in the study by Wu et al. [28] subjects were
mostly risk-seeking. An important difference between
these experiments is that in the previous study the noise
was given by the Brownian particle, whereas in the
current study (and also in [28]) the noise was given by
subjects’ own motor noise. In non-motor settings, the
‘illusion of control’ [42] is one of the core factors in caus-
ing people to mistake games of pure chance with games of
skill even though they are not controllable [43]. Hence, a
possible explanation for the difference in risk-sensitivity
in our case might be that subjects are risk-seeking because
they tend to be over-conﬁdent about their own generated
motor noise, but risk-averse with respect to noise that is
given in their environment. This hypothesis could be
tested in future experiments.
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